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Theological Studies
66 (2005)

THE ANALOGY OF TRADITION: METHOD AND
THEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT
JOHN E. THIEL

[The author examines a basic question for theological inquiry: how
is congruence between past and present meaning achieved in tradition and in theological judgment? He begins by criticizing the account of traditional continuity offered in the recent work ofKathryn
Tanner and by considering the limits of correlation in explaining
congruence in theological judgment. Constructivelyy he proposes an
understanding of method as a pragmatics of tradition in which a
certain use of analogy accounts for traditional and theological congruence.]

T

is an assumption of modern theology.
Theologians typically understand their work as the practice of doctrinal development, and so as the practice of the assumption that doctrine
develops. One would think that the basic practices that enact a field's
assumptions would merit the closest scrutiny, since they take shape as
disciplinary performance itself. To the contrary, the assumed, by its very
nature, tends to pass unexamined before the critical eye. This often occurs
because scholars think that basic practices obviously discharge the assumptions to which they are beholden. The disciplinary practice is taken to be so
simple a rendition of the assumptions that a critical account of how the
practice does what it does is deemed unnecessary. The practice is undertaken as though it transcends method, sometimes even when the practice
ostensibly enacts a method. Yet, on closer examination, the connection
between practice and assumptions proves to be tenuous at best. A good
example of such latitude in the field of theology can be found in how
theologians practice the assumption of doctrinal development.
Theologians engage in this interpretive practice all the time. But how,
exactly, does this practice happen, and how, exactly, does one know when
it is accomplished well or poorly? These are difficult questions to answer.
HE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE

JOHN E. THIEL received his Ph.D. from McMaster University. He is currently
professor of religious studies at Fairfield University, Fairfield, Connecticut. His
most recent books include God, Evil, and Innocent Suffering: A Theological Reflection (Crossroad, 2002) and Senses of Tradition: Continuity and Development in
Catholic Faith (Oxford University, 2000). At the present time he is working on a
book dealing with eschatology.
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One might begin by objecting that the questions are not posed very well,
since any answer would never be a matter of "exactly." As Schleiermacher
observed long ago, the practice of interpretation is not a science but an art.1
This art is a matter of judgment that requires the theologian to bridge the
distance, conceptually and expressively, between ancient meaning and its
contemporary appropriation. It would not be difficult, however, to say
exactly how interpretive practice fails. The extremes of the interpretive
spectrum—mindless repetition and "anything goes" speculation—would
fail for lack of judiciousness, by relinquishing the task of interpretation
itself. It may be the case that saying how interpretive judgment takes place,
exactly, between these extremes is neither possible nor even desirable, as
long as method provides some general guidelines for the hermeneutical
task to proceed meaningfully.
But even if "exactly" happily eludes us, the goal of this article is to say
more nearly how the assumption of doctrinal development is practiced in
theological reflection. I argue for a more detailed account of the interpretive practice at the heart of theological reflection, at the very point that
theological judgment claims success. This more detailed account could be
understood as a theological method, one that I will call the "analogy of
tradition." I make no claims for the novelty of this method. I think that
contemporary theologians actually do practice this method, though perhaps without being conscious of doing so. Before I sketch this method and
argue for its advantages, I will first define the theological problem that it
addresses.
CONGRUENCE IN TRADITION AND IN THEOLOGICAL JUDGMENT

Any theological judgment attempts to reconcile the relevance of contemporary concerns with faithfulness to the past. Such a judgment posits a
congruent relationship between past and present that may be weighted
more on the authority of the past or more on the pressing needs of the
moment, resulting in theological positions that are, respectively, more conservative or more liberal. By "congruent" I mean an interpretive relationship characterized by meaningful continuity between the authoritative past
and the contemporary theological claim, a continuity that believers understand as the unity of tradition and the basis of Christian faithfulness
through the ages. But how is this congruence in tradition achieved? And,
more specifically, how does this congruence come to be formulated in a
theological judgment? The first question has not troubled modern theol-

1
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Heidelberg: Carl
Winter Universitatsverlag, 1974) 75.
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ogy. As I have already noted, the development of doctrine is an assumption
of modern theology, and one that takes the congruence of developing
tradition for granted as one of its authentic traits. The second question has
been answered by any number of modern theorists on theological method
who have explained how congruence is formulated in theological judgment.
It would seem, then, that these questions have proven unproblematic, the
first because it has not been raised and the second because it has been
answered so easily and so often. I will argue that the assumption of traditional congruence requires the careful justification that it typically has
lacked, and that the methodological explanations of congruence in theological judgment typically are rather thin since the congruence they explain
is largely assumed. With regard to the first question, the work of Kathryn
Tanner can help us to appreciate why the assumption of congruence in
tradition is a large assumption indeed, and one that should not be made
uncritically.
In her important book Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology,
Tanner considers the implications of postmodern cultural theory for Christian claims about the continuity of tradition. If one truly appreciates the
remarkable diversity that flourishes in any culture, Tanner argues, then one
should be suspicious of customary Christian beliefs about the unity of the
cultural meaning system that Christians call "tradition." It may be tempting
to think of cultures as the "wholes" they are usually made out to be, by
insiders and outsiders alike. Understood, though, as the practice of everyday life, a culture takes shape as a limitless proliferation of meaning that
defies the unity, stability, and continuity over time that a structuralist mindset projects onto it. Traditional conceptions of culture, including those of
modern anthropologists, tend to deny internal difference, allowing difference to appear only at the margins of society where strained encounter
with other cultures reifies the myth of internal homogeneity. A postmodern
cultural theory, faithful to the evidence of cultural life "on the ground,"
recognizes the remarkable array of different beliefs and practices that any
culture is. Tanner maintains that extensive pluralism does not subvert the
possibility of cultural consensus. But in actual cultural life that consensus
"becomes . . . extremely minimalistic: it forms the basis for conflict as much
as it forms the basis for shared beliefs and sentiments." 2 Culture, she
proposes, is better conceived as a locus of contested engagement than as a
coalescence of shared beliefs and practices.
The assumption of congruence in tradition meets a significant challenge
in Tanner's position. A religious tradition, she avers, behaves just as any
culture does. In spite of its portrayal as a unified whole, it is actually an
2
Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997) 57.
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amalgam of beliefs and practices that hangs together only in the loosest
ways. Christian tradition is as porous as any culture. Its boundaries are
fluid and permeable; its cohesion little more than acts of imagination and
power serving a host of interests. The unity of Christian tradition, Tanner
points out, cannot be supported by historical investigation since such study
documents Christian disagreement through the ages about virtually every
matter of valued belief and practice. Even the most basic beliefs of Christianity—such as the belief in one God—instantly proliferate when extended to other beliefs, like God's relationship to the world, or to practices,
like what moral faithfulness to the one God really means. 3
Tanner does not conclude that Christian tradition is a chimera, only that
it is not some special case exempt from the ordinary workings of culture.
Christianity "may be called a tradition in the sense it amounts to a whole
ongoing way of life." But so understood, "talk of tradition is just a way of
formulating . . . questions about Christian identity . . . and is not a way of
answering them." 4 She proposes that the unity of Christian tradition lies
in shared concerns among Christians about the "materials" that they
value—such as texts, creedal formulae, and rituals—rather than in agreement about what these materials mean. Moreover, the unity of tradition,
and so Christian identity, lies in the commitment Christians make to the
ongoing task of arguing about the meaning of their materials, "[g]reat
diversity and conflict of particular interpretations [being]... more often
than not the result." 5
If Tanner is correct, then the assumption of congruence in tradition
cannot be justified by cultural behavior. Traditional congruence presumes
some level of semantic agreement through the ages. Tanner's analysis concludes that such congruence is absent both diachronically and synchronically. Tanner makes this point well by criticizing the assumption of congruence in premodern and modern notions of tradition. Such "accounts of
tradition make continuity in either traditional materials or the process of
transmission a presumption by isolating something from the vicissitudes of
history to guarantee it." 6 Attending specifically to the modern conception
of tradition as development, Tanner observes that "[g]reater attention is
given here to the process of transmission, but it is a process in which, it is
hoped, an identity of content or substance in what is transmitted is retained." In such a view, difference in any moment of historical development "amounts only to making explicit what was implicit before." The
3

Ibid. 146. See Tanner's important study of the diversity of ethical belief in the
one God. Kathryn Tanner, The Politics of God: Christian Theologies and Social
Justice (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992).
4
5
Ibid. 128.
Ibid. 153.
6
Ibid. 131.
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metaphor of organic life promotes the hope for continuity by imaging a
history in which "later developments are somehow present in a nascent
form earlier," just as later growth manifests the substance of the original
seed. 7 Tanner sees in this modern theory an unwillingness to acknowledge
the real evidence of history:
Thus, when organic life is the model for understanding tradition, no amount of
diversity in what Christians say and do need dislodge the presumption of their
agreement so long as they all seem members of an historically continuous, selfgenerating sequence of events; historical evidence of conflict and contradiction can
always be undercut by the claim of their containment within a higher-order process
that remains continuous.8
This analysis demonstrates good cause to question the assumption of congruence in tradition, including the modern conception of tradition as the
development of doctrine. This questionability does not force the conclusion
that traditional congruence is impossible. It does suggest, though, that
claims for congruence must be carefully justified and cannot be naively
assumed.
Suppose, though, that congruence were rooted in a developing tradition
in some way or another so that its assumption were obviously warranted,
and to such a degree that Tanner would cease to be concerned about all the
issues she has raised. We would still need to explain how that congruence
could be formulated in actual theological judgments, themselves exercises
in doctrinal development. As noted, there is no shortage of methodological
explanations for how particular theological judgments can be congruent.
Certainly the most prevalent theological method in the modern tradition is
some variety of correlation. According to this approach, the theologian's
interpretive abilities synthesize past and present, resulting in a contemporary appropriation of the faith that is congruent with the former and relevant to the latter. This interpretive reconstruction requires three distinguishable moments in judgment: the theologian must understand the classical doctrine being reconstructed in its own historical context; the
theologian must accurately assess the contemporary cultural circumstances
within which the classical doctrine is being reconstructed; and, finally, the
theologian must offer an interpretive reconstruction that is congruent with
the past and meaningful to the present.
It is this third, synthetic moment in theological judgment that proves
difficult to explain because it purports to offer something more in the act
of interpretation that cannot easily be explained with the precision that
method requires. As difficult as it may be to explain the first and second
moments in interpretation, they yet aim at judgments contextualized by
7

Ibid. 129.

Ibid. 131.
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particular historical circumstances, whether past or present. Even though
the object of interpretation in these moments may range from the concreteness of a carefully preserved text to the ephemeral character of a local
mentality, interpretation at these levels is historically determinate, and
kept so by a methodological awareness of the many particularities
that might be factored into a viable interpretation. Thus, the task of
method involves explaining the role of these particularities in the act of
understanding. But the third interpretive moment presses beyond these
relatively determinate parameters to posit a feature that transcends
them—the congruence that the reconstructive theological judgment claims
with the past.
Whether or not a particular theological judgment actually delivers on its
claim for congruence is, of course, a matter of performance measured
by further theological judgment. A community of interpretation may
judge that a particular theological reconstruction fails to execute the
method of correlation because it misrepresents either the authoritative past
or the character of contemporary experience and, as a consequence of
either failure, cannot achieve the relevant continuity expected of a successful act of correlation. Or, having accurately represented the interpretive
poles of correlation, the execution of the method might be judged to fail
because the interpretive synthesis lacks continuity or relevance or both.
Performance aside, though, correlationist interpretation assumes that congruence is an achievable feature of the third moment of theological judgment.
There is nothing wrong with this assumption as long as it is shared in a
community of interpreters which it well serves, and as long as interpreters
do not exaggerate the capacity of theological method to explain the assumption beyond its claims. Typically, practitioners of the method of correlation are keenly aware of the fact that theological hermeneutics flourishes in the circle of faith. Sometimes, though, the concerns of correlation
can suggest that its primary interpretive goal involves explaining the claims
of faith to a broader public or even to a universal audience. If correlation
is expected to proceed in this way, then the third interpretive moment is
burdened with a weight it cannot bear. In this case, the explanation of the
third moment is called upon to express the assumption of continuity that
religious claims for tradition are wont to make and to do so in a manner
cogent to those who do not share this assumption. This kind of explanatory
overdetermination proceeds as though the theological use of a hermeneutical theory can convey universal meaning simply by virtue of its respectability in quarters beyond the community of faith. Yet, on closer examination, the theory invoked only offers the possibility of universality in
understanding by investing some metaphor for epistemic reconciliation
with remarkable explanatory power. Metaphors such as the "merging of

364

THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

horizons" (Horizontverschmelzung),9 the "fusion of past and present," 10
the "conversion" of the interpreter to the interpreted, 11 "reflective equilibrium," 12 the "retrieval" of content in contemporary form,13 or even the
term "correlation" itself,14 all attempt to convey the workings of the third
interpretive moment, expressing at once the unity attributed to an authentic act of understanding and the congruence of tradition posited in that
same unity.
Metaphors, however, do not possess the ability to ground understanding
or traditional continuity. Functioning like a poetics of judgment, the metaphors express the epistemic reconciliation of the universal in the particular
and, more specifically, the traditional reconciliation of past and present for
which theological interpretation aims. To the degree that each of the metaphors can be invoked to convey both of these epistemic and traditional
concerns at once, they are all the more valued as linguistic conveyors of
what successful theological judgment hopes to achieve. But in themselves,
the metaphors and the theoretical accounts they express do not validate
anything at all. They do not explain how congruence actually happens in a
theological judgment, only how the goal of congruence, the experience of
congruence, or the claims of congruence might be expressed in images. The
effect of the metaphor, one might say, is to express the assumption of
congruence meaningfully claimed in a particular act of theological judgment. Images for agreement like those cited above, however, cannot explain how congruence actually takes shape in theological judgments.
9

Many theologians have found this imagery, drawn from Hans-Georg Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode, to be an effective expression of the hermeneutical
project. See especially, David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in
Theology (New York: Seabury, 1975) 78; also his, The Analogical Imagination:
Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981)
99-135.
10
Roger Haight, S.J., Dynamics of Theology (New York: Paulist, 1990) 191.
11
Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., Method in Theology (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1972) 235-66. In spite of Neil Ormerod's efforts to distinguish Lonergan's
method (and, following Lonergan, Robert Doran's method) from correlation, I
would place more stock in his concession that, on the face of it, Lonergan's (and
Doran's) "project bears a strong resemblance to the description of the method of
correlation" (Neil Ormerod, "Quarrels with the Method of Correlation," Theological Studies 57 [1996] 711). And rather than finding in Lonerganian "conversion" a
non-arbitrary criterion for interpretive judgment, as Ormerod does (712-13), I
would take the term to function as another synthetic metaphor for epistemic reconciliation.
12
Francis Schtissler Fiorenza, Foundational Theology: Jesus and the Church
(New York: Crossroad, 1986) 283-311.
13
This has been an axiomatic discourse on the part of many late-20th-century
Protestant and Catholic theologians.
14
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1967)
59-66; Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order 45-46.
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In making this point, I am not suggesting that theological judgments
reached through correlation fail because the method's third moment only
expresses the goal, experience, or the claims of congruence. The success of
a theological judgment is measured by its acceptance in the community of
faith, and theological judgments reached through correlation have been
extraordinarily successful in this regard. But correlation is much better at
offering methodological accounts of its first and second moments, in which
no claim is made for congruence, than it is at offering a methodological
account of the third moment, in which congruence is claimed. And to the
degree that the third moment in correlation is much more a poetics than a
methodological explanation, it does not explain how congruence comes to
be formulated in theological judgment with the exactness one expects of
method.
THE PERSISTENCE OF ANALOGY IN CATHOLIC METHOD
Another way of making the same point about the explanatory limits of
correlation would be to note that this method takes its point of departure
from the Kantian philosophical project and, more recently, from the phenomenological tradition represented by Heidegger, Gadamer, and
Ricoeur. Here, the critique of traditional metaphysics issued in epistemologies that stressed the role of agency in understanding, an agency rooted in
the transcendental conditions of subjectivity itself. However measured by
its own historicity, transcendental subjectivity formally establishes the possibility of meaning in these philosophies and functions as the power of
hermeneutical construction. Theologians found this philosophical approach useful not only because it defined a respectable current in modern
thought but also because its account of rational agency could be appropriated methodologically. Correlationists from Schleiermacher to Rahner and
his contemporary disciples have argued in various ways that the modern
philosophical "turn to the subject" is fully realized in the act of faith, itself
the consummate experience of self-transcendence. Mystical sensibilities
could posit a tacit identity between the conditions of subjectivity (as noetic
transcendence) and the act of faith (as transcendence toward God). This
perceived compatibility between transcendental subjectivity and the act of
faith allowed correlationists to see an agential unity between these experiences at work in the third moment of their method, with transcendental
subjectivity supplying the conditions for the possibility of hermeneutical
reconciliation and faith supplying the traditional congruence required in
any successful interpretation. To the degree that this hermeneutical cooperation of transcendental subjectivity and faith promulgates mystical sensibilities, it is not surprising that its interpretive achievement is conveyed
much more in metaphorical images than in exact, methodological explanation.
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As Catholic theology embraced modernity, hermeneutics overshadowed
metaphysical analogy as credible method, at least on the part of the many
theologians committed to apologetics. Metaphysical analogy made the doctrine of creation central to theological reflection, and thus gave ontology
primacy over epistemology. The Kantian critique of traditional metaphysics undermined this long-standing conception of theology as analogical
speculation, a philosophical stance that modern and postmodern hermeneutics regarded as intellectually axiomatic. The method of correlation
appeared in theology as a viable alternative to metaphysical analogy. Its
willingness to parse theological understanding through the historicity of
interpretation satisfied post-Kantian concerns for the limitations of knowledge. Its diminishment of the doctrine of creation in theological reflection
allowed the doctrine of grace to grow in methodological importance, especially as an unstated presupposition for how theological judgment reconciles past and present and achieves the value of congruence.
As much as analogy in a traditional key has been rendered theologically
questionable, it is yet interesting to note how analogy has persisted as a
theme in Catholic thought. In the early 20th-century, Erich Przywara articulated a distinctly modern version of the analogia ends that took account
of both transcendental subjectivity and the metaphysical order as the common realm of creatureliness through which faith-filled reasoning encounters both the presence and otherness of God. Przywara's eclectic understanding of analogy even included a dialectical interpretation of the Cross,
a classically Lutheran theme. Even though his treatment of analogy was
untraditionally pluralistic in some respects, Przywara saw his work as a
contribution to a theme consistently at the heart of Catholic thought. He
insisted that metaphysical analogy is not merely one option among others
within the Catholic heritage of reflection. "For the historical system of the
Great Tradition (Ur-Tradition)," Przywara asserts, "appears not as something 'constructed out of the analogia ends, rather, the analogia ends shows
itself to be the rhythm of its inner movement." 15 Even if Przywara's claim
seems somewhat inflated in an age that increasingly has appreciated the
pluralism of Catholic thinking, he is certainly correct to highlight the attractiveness of analogy for Catholic theology, even throughout the modern
period. This attractiveness is evinced in the continuing appropriation and
adaptation of analogy in the work of Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain,
Joseph Marechal, Emerich Coreth, David Burrell, and David Tracy. 16
15
Erich Przywara, Analogia Ends: Metaphysik: Ur-Struktur und All-Rhythmus,
2nd ed. (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1962) 204.
16
The observation about Gilson, Maritain, Marechal, Coreth, and Burrell is
Tracy's (The Analogical Imagination, 414). Recently, Robert Masson has called
attention to the various ways in which analogy is understood in theological dis-
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Of these inventive thinkers, David Tracy has demonstrated the flexibility
of analogy most of all by making it central to his own hermeneutical approach to theology, and so, with some measure of irony, appropriating for
the modern trajectory of transcendental subjectivity an important dimension of the reflective approach it criticized. For Tracy, analogy is not a
metaphysics but a rhetoric. It is a "language of ordered relationships articulating similarity-in-difference," a language that finally can find interpretive harmony among the plenitude of past and present forms that comprise a religious tradition. 17 Moreover, analogy describes the creative
workings of the theological imagination that is able to see similarity in
difference, and through such vision to reach an understanding of how
religious meaning illuminates self, society, history, and cosmos. Although
that imaginative power finally takes its orientation from a specific religious
tradition, it is not restricted to it but is capable of recognizing "the profound similarities-in-difference in all reality," 18 and thus breaks open interpretive directions that are both particular and universal in scope.
The persistence of analogy in the Catholic tradition likely reflects basic
Catholic beliefs about the relationship between nature and grace. Both
metaphysical and rhetorical approaches to analogy affirm God's sacramental presence to the natural world, and the ability of the human person to
respond freely to that presence, even, as the theologian does, by capturing
the unity of God and creatures in theological homologies. The distinctiveness of analogy as a Catholic approach to theological reflection has even
been accentuated by the modern era's concern for the particularities of
method, especially those defined by confessional beliefs. The polemical
exchange between Karl Barth and Przywara over the integrity of metaphysical analogy, and Hans Urs von Balthasar's charting of the debate in
several writings, was influential in differentiating Catholic and Protestant
methodological approaches as, respectively, "analogy" and "dialectic," the
distinction itself a rhetoric expressing differing confessional commitments
on the relationship between nature and grace. 19

course, and to how the failure to appreciate this variety can lead to misunderstanding between theologians. Robert Masson, "Analogy and Metaphoric Process,"
Theological Studies 62 (2001) 571-96. I agree completely with Masson's implicit
conclusion that the pluralism in conceptions of analogy means that analogical discourse is itself analogical, and recognize that this observation applies to the proposal I will offer in the pages that follow.
17
Tracy, The Analogical Imagination 405.
18
Ibid. 410.
19
Hans Urs von Balthasar, "Analogie und Dialektik," Divus Thomas 22 (1944)
171-216; idem, "Analogie und Natur," Divus Thomas 23 (1945) 3-56. See also
James V. Zeitz, "Przywara and von Balthasar on Analogy," The Thomist 52 (1988)
473-98. For an interesting discussion of Barth on the analogia fidei, see Christopher
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It would be advantageous, I propose, to continue this Catholic devotion
to analogy in theological method, not metaphysically in Przywara's style
but linguistically in the approach broadly commended by Tracy. Although
I have been critical of the method of correlation's ability to explain theological congruence with sufficient rigor, I remain convinced with Tracy that
its attention to language rather than to ontology has accomplished much as
a post-Enlightenment strategy, and with Tracy convinced too of the enduring value of analogy. In the pages that follow, I argue for a kind of
linguistic analogy that describes more thickly how a claim for congruence
actually appears in theological interpretation. As much as this analogy
accounts for theological interpretation, it does not originate in theological
thinking but rather in the way that believers make claims about tradition.
Our consideration of congruence in theological judgment, then, must follow a discussion of analogy in tradition.
TRADITION AS ANALOGICAL CONTINUITY
A considerable amount of time and effort has been devoted to the topic
of tradition in post-Enlightenment theology. Nineteenth-century theologians such as Johann Sebastian Drey, Johann Adam Mohler, and John
Henry Newman proposed theories of doctrinal development that attempted to reconcile theology's new sense of historicity with long-held
Christian claims about the continuity of tradition. Since the Second Vatican
Council, a second wave in the theology of tradition has appeared in the
work of theologians who challenged the a-historical sensibilities of neoScholasticism. Most notable among these was Yves Congar, whose magisterial La Tradition et les traditions promulgated an understanding of tradition as an active process involving the reception and, as Congar put it,
re-reception of the authoritative teachings and practices of the past by
contemporary believers. 20 The reception model has become a kind of theological commonsense since the Council, embraced by the magisterium and
theologians alike.
As one might expect, the assumptions at work in a modern understanding of tradition have shaped how theology itself is conceived and practiced.
Doctrinal development assumes the historicity of meaning and the inescapably interpretive character of experience and its cultural construction.

Morse, "Raising God's Eyebrows: Some Further Thoughts on the Analogia Fidei,"
Union Seminary Quarterly Review 37 (1981-82) 39-49.
20
Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., La Tradition et les traditions, vol. 1: Essai historique
(Paris: Fayard, 1960); vol. 2: Essai theologique (Paris: Fayard, 1963). Also, Yves
Congar, "La 'reception' comme realite ecclesiologique," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 56 (1972) 369-403.
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To the degree that theology is the practice of doctrinal development, these
same assumptions enter its disciplinary repertoire, resulting in an understanding of theology as ever revisable interpretation and, lately, in theology's postmodern attention to the pluralism of meaning in local cultures.
One would be hard pressed to find more particular influences of the theology of tradition on theological method itself, beyond, again, the general
sense that method is assumed to be a thoroughly hermeneutical endeavor. 21 Tradition tends to enter Catholic theological method as one of
several "sources" of interpretation. Along with Scripture and experience,
tradition has been conceived as a kind of interpretive ingredient that contributes its own measure of truth to the creative synthesis of theological
judgment. Rather than understand tradition as a factor in theological interpretation, we would do better to regard it as the practice of faith that
configures the congruence to which theological judgment aspires. Analogy
offers an interesting way to imagine how such congruence is affirmed in the
pattern of tradition.
Recently, I have argued for what I have called a "retrospective" understanding of tradition that traces the continuity of tradition from present to
past, rather than from past to present. 22 Premodern and modern conceptions of tradition typically imagine continuity as a given feature of every
moment of traditional time, from the apostolic age to the present. A premodern conception of tradition sees such continuity unchangingly manifest
in the orthodox faith and practice handed down by every generation to the
next. A modern conception of tradition as the development of doctrine
sees such continuity as at least latent in every moment, and manifesting
itself gradually as history unfolds. Both premodern and modern conceptions envisage tradition prospectively. They imagine tradition from the
perspective of an idealized observer at its beginnings in the apostolic age
looking forward into the future, across the ages, and seeing the one and
same continuity, or at least its possibility, in every time. This prospective
optics actually imagines tradition from a divine perspective, since only God
could envision tradition in this manner. The attractiveness of this forwardlooking optics is that it clearly affirms the unbroken history of continuity
expected by premodern and modern conceptions of tradition.
A retrospective understanding of tradition relinquishes this divine per21

Lonergan articulated well this general influence of historical sensibilities on
theology: "When the classicist notion of theology prevails, theology is conceived as
a permanent achievement, and then one discourses on its nature. When culture is
conceived empirically, theology is known to be an ongoing process, and then one
writes on its method" (Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., Method in Theology [New
York: Herder and Herder, 1972] xi).
22
John E. Thiel, Senses of Tradition: Continuity and Development in Catholic
Faith (New York: Oxford University, 2000) esp. 84-95.
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spective, which no creature may have, and configures traditional continuity
from the present moment in ecclesial life. Tradition, after all, is a corporate
act of faith that the Church makes about when and where and how God's
Spirit has truthfully wended its way through history. This corporate claim
is a consensus drawn from many individual acts of faith that are always
situated in a present moment and which, from that present moment looking
backward, affirm a particular belief about the presence of the Spirit
through time. This retrospective affirmation is the Church's belief about
the continuity of tradition. As much as continuity can be imagined as a
fixed commodity abidingly present from the earliest Church to the present,
it is, in actuality, a retrospective claim about the unity of tradition that
continues only as long as it is presently believed. What moderns have
conceived as the development of tradition unfolds in perceptible changes in
how the pattern of retrospective continuity is modified in successive
present moments. And if the continuity of tradition lies in the claims of
corporate acts of faith developing in time, then what modern theories are
inclined to distinguish as the "continuity" of tradition and the "development" of tradition are actually the same thing.
Saying that the "continuity" and the "development" of tradition are
actually the same thing might suggest a position quite like Tanner's r with its
deep suspicion of any real continuity in tradition beyond the ongoing,
historical debate among Christians about what tradition is. A retrospective
understanding of tradition, however, affirms real continuity as a claim that
Christians make about the unity of tradition from their own times back to
the apostolic age. Certainly there are some Christian claims—such as the
profession of Jesus as savior, the indispensability of grace for salvation, and
the hope of resurrected life—that believers have made consistently from
the beginnings of the tradition to the present. And yet, even these relatively settled and uncontroversial claims for tradition continue to flourish
as retrospective acts of faith, developing if only in their stolid reaffirmation.
More surprising affirmations of continuity occur as any particular generation of believers layers these more stable lines of tradition with new claims
for retrospective continuity that may develop, slowly or quickly, into
present claims for the apostolic tradition. By the same token, a strand
within tradition's long-held claims may atrophy, slowly or quickly, to the
point that a particular generation judges the belief to be incredible, and so
no longer the Church's tradition. Through the reaffirmation of the truly
old, the accretion of the relatively new, or the shedding of the old but
obsolete, the entire community of faith comes to affirm a developing continuity that, in any present moment, may look quite like the faith of times
long past in some respects, and quite different from the claims of earlier
believers in other respects.
This retrospective understanding of tradition, then, understands conti-
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nuity to be thoroughly temporal, as all things traditional are, and measures
the time in which continuity is claimed in faith from present to past. So
understood, the continuity of tradition develops at once repetitively and
dynamically, as old configurations of continuity are reaffirmed alongside
new affirmations of continuity for addition and loss that are often mutually
related. What I would call the "literal sense" of tradition 23 lies in present
claims for continuity that are uncontroversial, not because their meaning is
judged to be trivial but because there is a real consensus among believers
about the truthfulness of these claims as the age-old faith of the Church.
Many of the claims of the literal sense, like those cited above, are historically old and are continuous by virtue of their repetition in every generation of believers. But claims for the literal sense in any historical moment
in which they are affirmed need not be historically old, even though they
are claimed in faith as the apostolic tradition. A good example of the latter
would be the teaching of the Second Vatican Council's "Declaration on
Religious Freedom" (Dignitatis humanae) which portrayed the freedom of
religious belief as a sacred right revealed by God, and so a teaching rightly
placed within the apostolic tradition, even though this teaching was neither
believed, nor taught, nor practiced in the previous history of the Church,
and defined rather suddenly in 1965.24
This understanding of traditional continuity can stand before the criticisms advanced by Kathryn Tanner and examined earlier. 25 As devastating
as Tanner's position may be for any fundamentalist understanding of traditional continuity, its deep suspicion of any real continuity in tradition fails
to acknowledge that the literal sense of tradition is a claim that a particular
Christian community makes in faith retrospectively. Tanner advances her
argument against synchronic continuity, one notices, by making an ahistorical and idealized "Christianity" the measure of synchronic and diachronic continuity. But "Christianity"—what all Christians believe—is an
abstraction that does not exist "on the ground," the very place from which
Tanner's anthropological approach gathers its evidence. Synchronic continuity actually exists more modestly in history in specific Christian traditions shaped by particular kinds of agreement in faith. Present-day agreement, for example, certainly does not exist between all Christians on a
doctrinal issue like the relationship between nature and grace. And yet,
Roman Catholic Christians in the present historical moment do indeed
23

Ibid. 31-55.
Dignitatis humanae (Declaration on Religious Freedom) nos. 2-3. Translation
from Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 2, ed. Norman P. Tanner, S.J. (Washington: Georgetown University, 1990) 1002-04.
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This, of course, is a claim of mine with which Tanner would not agree. See the
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share a belief about this same matter. Tanner's argument against diachronic continuity is simply that the evidence of history does not warrant
such a claim. But this judgment wrongly makes chronological history the
measure of traditional continuity, itself a claim made in faith about the
temporal pattern of divine truth and providence. Judged against this standard, it is hardly surprising that traditional continuity evaporates like
morning dew in the sun. Even though faith-claims for traditional continuity
are in history and so are a part of the historical record of Christianity, they
can no more be theologically measured by chronological history than the
truth of the gospels can be measured theologically by the Jesus of history
or the resurrection of Jesus can be measured theologically by the laws of
physics.
Understood retrospectively and particularly, the literal sense of tradition
runs counter to the direction of chronological time as the Church's contemporary, and developing, affirmation of how its belief, doctrine, and
practice stand in continuity with the faith of the apostles. As an act of faith,
this affirmation of congruence is no mere possibility but instead the most
ordinary of actualities in the daily life of the Church, and one that believers
attribute largely to divine grace. Tanner, then, is correct to point out that
the congruence of tradition is a very large assumption indeed, as the claims
of faith always are.
To say that claims for the congruence of tradition are claims of faith,
however, should not be invoked as an explanatory panacea. If present-day
claims for a particular configuration of the apostolic tradition differ from
the claims of earlier generations of believers, then explaining how this can
be so, contrary to the historical record, is incumbent on any theology of
tradition worth its salt. A premodern understanding of tradition is unaware
of the historical record and so is able naively to regard present-day claims
for the apostolic tradition as what every previous generation believed in
exactly the same way. Here, difference is heretical deviation. Aware of the
historical record, a modern understanding of tradition as the development
of doctrine regards the historical absence of present-day claims for the
apostolic tradition as latency through which later developments have
grown. Here, difference is potential. A premodern understanding of tradition held in the modern period, i.e., fundamentalism, denies the truth of
the historical record of which it is aware. Here, difference is the perdition
of a merely secular account of reality. None of these explanations is adequate—neither the premodern understandings for their naive or willed
ignorance of the facts of history nor the modern understanding for its
recourse to a romantic metaphysics of essence and manifestation to explain
the gaps in the history of doctrine.
The retrospective model addresses the problem of continuity and change
by regarding congruence as a claim made in faith by present-day believers
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about how they stand in a line of truth that extends back to the apostolic
age. It is a claim that can neither be ignorant of chronological history nor
beholden to it. Claims for congruence presently affirmed as sacred tradition often cannot be justified by the evidence of chronological history, as
Tanner rightly points out. And yet, those even centuries-long gaps in the
historical record would only subvert a faith-claim for a particular pattern of
continuity if one assumed that claims for the apostolic tradition were historically identical with the retrospective claims of faith made in the apostolic age, or if one assumed that traditional continuity requires chronological justification in order to be true. A retrospective understanding of
tradition would share neither of these assumptions.
Retrospective claims for the continuity of tradition can find their way
through the brokenness of chronological history by tracing the Spirit's
abiding presence through the retrospective claims of previous generations
of believers all the way back to the apostolic age. As long as such a presentday affirmation of apostolic continuity recognizes that it is a claim made in
faith about sacred time, the gaps in the historical record need not prove
defeating. A good example of such a retrospective claim for apostolic
continuity in the face of chronological history can be found in the presentday Catholic literal sense belief in the Immaculate Conception of Mary.
Historical study shows that this belief did not become popular until the
14th century and that, prior to that time, no less an authority than Thomas
Aquinas found it to be incredible. 26 In principle, the belief that Mary, the
Mother of God, was herself conceived without original sin could not have
been widely held by Christians prior to Augustine's fifth-century definition
of the doctrine of original sin in the Pelagian controversy. And yet, Pius IX,
in his solemn definition of the dogma in 1854, described it as "a doctrine
revealed by God . . . [which] therefore must be firmly and constantly held
by the faithful,"27 as it indeed was by the 19th century. Explained retrospectively, this claim for apostolic tradition can be justified by finding a
pattern of continuity that stretches backward from the present-day claim,
to the increasing belief in the doctrine since the 14th century that united
even earlier retrospective beliefs about the sinlessness of the Savior, the
dignity of Mary as the Mother of God, and Augustine's development of
Paul's strong conception of human fallenness. Thus construed from present
to past in solidarity with previous generations of believers, a present-day
claim for apostolic continuity can traverse the gaps of chronological time.
26
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We might conceive of this way of configuring continuity as an exercise in
the analogy of faith and, to the degree that faith may be expressed as claims
about the Spirit's presence to history, as an exercise in the analogy of
tradition. Analogy posits meaningful similarity-in-difference in whatever
dimension of reality the analogue highlights, whether in language, or experience, or in being. Here, our focus on traditional faith-claims leads us to
attend to analogy from a linguistic perspective, while regarding that language as inseparably bound to the experience it expresses and shapes, and
to the being to which language refers. Claims about tradition are thoroughly analogical. In professing the unity of tradition, believers give voice
to a belief or enact a practice that most obviously is theirs, but which also
is claimed as the belief and practice of others, and which so, on another
level, is belief and practice other than theirs. These "others" are both
contemporary believers who are not distant in time but who may be relatively distant in culture, and believers long dead who are distant in culture
and time as well. Yet, in professing the unity of tradition, believers affirm
that their faith and practice, both diachronically and synchronically, is like
the belief and practice of these others, in spite of the striking differences in
time, place, circumstance, and culture that divide them. This analogical
likeness is not claimed as a mere casual resemblance. Perceived through
the eyes of faith, analogical likeness is the deep congruence of a shared
faith capable of binding the tradition from present to past. It is an analogical continuity justified by the oneness of the body of Christ, and marking
the truthful presence of the Holy Spirit through time, place, circumstance,
and culture.
At first glance, the most steadfast, literal sense claims of tradition, which
even historical investigation shows have been affirmed throughout the
ages, might seem to transcend this analogical similarity-in-difference by
virtue of their continuous repetition. Yet, on closer examination, even
these long-standing claims, which flourish only in their present affirmation,
are always somewhat different from the past claims they ardently reaffirm.
Even as reaffirmations of the tradition, the present claims for the age-old
tradition are ever made anew, and so each act of faith posits a difference
that must be at once appreciated and transcended in the claim for continuity. At the heart of this dimension of tradition we meet a continuity
solidified within a remarkable pluralism of dissimilar times and cultures.
Within this pluralism of time and place we find an even greater pluralism
of individual acts of faith, the most recent faithfully striving to find in those
that came before an analogue to their own claims for the apostolic truth.
Literal sense claims that are more circumscribed historically, like the
dogma of the Immaculate Conception or Vatican IPs teaching on religious
freedom, may also be conceived through the image of analogical continuity. Here, though, the more extensive historical gaps that faith must retro-
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spectively traverse require that analogical similarity be found not only in
acts of faith across time and culture but also in various doctrines defined
throughout the tradition as common acts of faith. Although these doctrines
are by no means the same, believers find a homology between them that
becomes the basis for their present-day claim for apostolic continuity. Once
again, the Immaculate Conception of Mary may serve as an example. Latter-day believers in the dogma affirm it as abiding tradition by finding a
real homology among the doctrines it presupposes and affirms as a claim
about the Mother of God, doctrines such as the sinlessness of the Savior,
the dignity of Mary, and Augustine's further strengthening of Paul's already strong conception of sin. This homology extends across time in a way
that the evidence of chronological history does not, and forms a continuity
that contemporary believers analogically may trace back to the earliest
beliefs of the apostles.
The relations between and among claims for the old (even if not historically old) are not the only kind of analogy that can be identified in the
workings of tradition. The traditional reiteration of old claims in the present moment is often accompanied by claims for the traditionally new.
These novel claims cannot be regarded as authoritative tradition since they
lack the deep consensus on the part of the whole Church that literal sense
tradition requires. Nonetheless, the minority of the faithful who make a
novel claim profess the belief that their claim deserves to be recognized as
the age-old faith of the Church even if historical investigation clearly shows
that their claim was not previously believed in the way it is presently
articulated. Nearly every literal sense claim of the tradition was once a
novel claim, which means, of course, that the development of tradition
proceeds as the new is embraced, quickly or slowly, as the old. Contemporary minority beliefs and practices like gender-inclusive symbolism of
God, the ethical authority of the preferential option for the poor, and the
new argument that the restriction of priestly ministry to males is divine
revelation are all examples of novel claims of faith that may or may not
prove to be authoritative tradition with the passing of time. 28
Believers advance novel claims on behalf of tradition, at least implicitly,
by finding analogues within the recognized authority of the literal sense
that justifies their claims for congruence. These analogical connections
between the literal sense and novel claims are always tenuous, since here
analogical similarity faces a difference that is scandalous and marked by
both the strangeness and the minority status of the claim. Difference in this
regard is no longer merely the dissimilarity of re-affirmation in many times
and places but the threatening difference of apparent deviation that yet
claims orthodoxy. If the novel claim eventually becomes literal-sense tra28
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dition, this threatening difference will be transformed into the customary
difference of repetition as the whole Church increasingly affirms the analogical similarity between the new belief and the literal sense to the point
that the latter engulfs the former. It is important to note too that this
development may unfold at the same time through judgments in faith
measured by what we might call "disanalogy." Often, though not always,
claims for the traditionally new are accompanied by claims that some longstanding belief or practice has become questionable or even rejectable, and
so disanalogous with a re-configured analogical continuity that binds the
tradition into a whole. 29
Since the 19th century, theologians have proposed several images for the
development of doctrine, among them, Johann Sebastian Drey's notion of
a productive "dialectic" of past and present faith, John Henry Newman's
noetic metaphor of doctrines as ideas in process of clarification, and 20thcentury appeals to ongoing "reception" on the part of believers. Invoking
the image of analogy to account for the development of doctrine might be
felicitous for several reasons. First, and as noted earlier, analogy has been
a template for describing the God-world relationship throughout much of
the Catholic tradition, perhaps because analogical homology reflects the
deeply sacramental spirituality of the Catholic tradition expressed especially in its beliefs in the eucharistic Real Presence, the knowability of God
through creation, and the human person's capacity for free response to the
offer of grace. Second, employing the category of analogy in a theology of
tradition interprets the tradition by appeal to a traditional conceptualization and rhetoric, a theological approach that affirms the resiliency of the
tradition as a source of meaning. Third, and finally, enlisting analogy to
explain traditional similarity in the face of historical difference fits well
with the retrospective account of tradition presented here. Analogy offers
a way of appreciating how a present-day faith, looking to configure its
authoritative heritage back to the apostolic age, finds homologies through
a past rife with differences between what Christians claim as tradition
today and what Christians did or did not claim as tradition in any previous
historical moment. The analogical image conveys the assumptions of the
retrospective model, particularly its expectation that the unity of tradition
continues to be tempered by historical difference and yet may be meaningfully affirmed in spite of historical difference.
Analogy, of course, could be put to the service of a prospective account
of tradition, and tacitly often is. But when it is, an established tradition
tends to see only itself in the latest passing moment, assuming, contrary to
the evidence of history, that the continuance of tradition will reiterate only
what has been. Here analogical homology breaks down, losing its rightful
29
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appreciation for the differences that ever contextualize similarity and giving way to a narcissistic fixation on tradition's customary face. It is precisely
in this regard that the Fourth Lateran Council's "rule of faith" on analogy
might be applied, not in the metaphysical context in which it was originally
defined but in the linguistic setting of a theology of tradition. The teaching
of the Council—that "between creator and creature there can be noted no
similarity so great that a greater dissimilarity cannot be seen between
them" 30 —should remind us that tradition is the Church's ongoing, and very
tentative, effort to name the presence of God's Spirit in history. Portrayed
as analogical homology, traditional continuity names the Spirit's presence
in a particular configuration of belief, doctrine, and practice from present
to past. 31 But however much confidence the Church places in its naming of
traditional continuity, it must be ready to acknowledge that its naming is
never adequate to what is being named, not only because God is beyond
human naming but also because God's gift of the Spirit continues to course
through history in surprising ways that should undermine any sense that
what the Church claims as the continuity of tradition has been utterly
settled.
ANALOGY IN THEOLOGICAL METHOD
Now we are ready to attempt an answer to the question of how congruence is achieved in theological judgment. The workings of tradition
sketched above will point the way to our answer. First, though, we should
state what our answer will not be. We will not address this question in a
Kantian manner, taking it to be a question about the transcendental conditions that attend the theological task. That kind of question is asked when
theology is regarded first and foremost as an exercise in apologetics, and
theologians have the utmost concern to justify what they do before the
court of reason at-large. Our approach to the question should measure the
possibility of theological judgment by what faith actually does, in cooperation with reason, in making a theological judgment. The context for asking
and answering the question should be the community of faith in which
asking and answering takes place first and foremost as an exercise in ecclesial responsibility and self-understanding, and not as an exercise in selfjustification.
Congruence in theological judgment is achieved as theological judgment
30
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follows the actual lines of congruence shaped by faithful judgments about
traditional continuity. Christian communities constantly chart their claims
for the congruence of tradition by re-affirming long-held lines of continuity, adjusting new claims for tradition to these well-hewn paths back to the
apostolic age, and occasionally leaving behind past claims that the community no longer finds worthy of belief or practice. The congruence
claimed in theological judgment is the very same congruence that different
acts of faith make in positing a particular configuration of traditional congruence. The congruence claimed may be a time-honored line of literalsense continuity that charts the tradition's most basic beliefs. Or the congruence claimed may be a new affirmation of continuity that configures the
ancient tradition in a somewhat different way, but which yet clamors for
recognition as the rightful authority of the past. Typically, theological representations of literal-sense congruence proceed aesthetically by way of
description, while theological representations of novel congruence proceed
forensically by way of argumentation. Any theology, though, makes its case
for truthfulness by adjusting its judgments to a particular pattern of analogical continuity that stretches, retrospectively, from present to past. A
judgment for theological congruence may be very much like the act of
repetition that any claim for literal sense tradition is, finding truth in an
analogical homology weighted decidedly on the side of traditional similarity. Or a judgment for theological congruence may bind beliefs across time
unusually, finding truth in an analogical homology that appreciates creative
difference and envisions tradition in new ways. In either case, theological
judgments for congruence mirror traditional judgments for congruence.
The practice of theology, rightly understood, is the practice of tradition.
We might think of theological judgments for congruence as specialized
forms of traditional judgments for congruence. Their specialized character
is a function of the knowledge that theologians possess about the historical
dimensions of tradition, a knowledge that most believers throughout the
tradition have lacked. While all believers encounter tradition holistically in
the living intersections of belief, practice, and worship, theologians are able
to conceive of tradition in a linear way and to perceive how the analogy of
tradition configures continuity in ways that run counter to a faithless chronology of the past. This knowledge presents no advantage to faith. But it
does enable theologians to understand how the development of doctrine
has transpired throughout Catholic tradition and to appreciate the contributions of theological judgment to that process. Theological judgments for
congruence are an important way, though not the only way, of bringing the
tradition under reflective scrutiny so that ancient claims for analogical
continuity may once again be affirmed meaningfully in the present moment
or so that new claims might be ranked analogically among the treasures of
the past in spite of their chronological audacity. As an exercise in the
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development of doctrine, the theological judgment for congruence has a
role in shaping the very same traditional judgment for congruence that it
mirrors.
This close relationship between theological judgment and traditional
judgment should be reflected in methodological considerations of the theological task. I propose that we think of theological method as the analogy
of tradition, since the congruence to which theological judgment aspires is
achieved by drawing the same analogical lines of continuity between
present and past that traditional judgments draw in developing the tradition in every passing moment. 32 Delineating this theological method would
be no different from describing the various ways in which faith analogically
claims the congruence of tradition. And this, in turn, means that the
method of theology lies in the exercise of traditional faith itself, most
especially at the point that method explains how congruence in theological
judgment is achieved. Method is not something imported into theology to
explain the possibility of theological judgment but is itself an implementation of that same faithful judgment.
From a certain perspective, this might seem to be a claim falsely inflated
in its simplicity, and one that runs counter to the current proposal. Analogy, a critic might object, is not traditional faith but a theoretical account
of how faith is construed historically. And once enlisted into theological
service, analogy behaves like any theory of correlation, biting off far more
than it can chew in accounting for how theological judgment achieves
congruence. Although I would be willing to concede that analogy is a
theory, I would argue that its interpretive history in Catholic theology
demonstrates its compatibility with the basic claims of faith that it explains,
even to the extent that analogical discourse has entered the rhetoric of faith
in the Catholic tradition. Moreover, the analogy of tradition, as presented
here, explains what faith has done in the past and what faith continues to
do in the future. Analogical thinking finds meaningful patterns of unity
through the confusion of linguistic, experiential, and metaphysical plurality. The analogy of tradition is shaped as the whole Church together finds
the authoritative continuity of tradition through the chaos of chronological
time. Proposed here as theological method, the analogy of tradition is a
way of understanding the actual use to which theological judgment puts a
particular claim for congruence. 33 Finally, that interpretive use can only be
32
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measured against the use to which the Church puts its claims in faith for
traditional congruence.
Analogy thus understood is not a special theory imported as a relevant
means for parsing the experience of the Church. It is a way of imaging the
remarkable process through which the Church professes the distinctive
presence of God to history, a presence that surprises as much as it steadfastly abides. Special theories may aid in explaining the first and second
moments of correlation, in recovering the ancient past or in elucidating the
present moment. But they cannot explain how traditional or theological
congruence between those moments is achieved. Traditional or theological
congruence is finally achieved by grace, and the analogy of tradition describes how faith gracefully and actually claims divine pattern in history. It
may be that the metaphors of reconciliation that convey the act of synthetic
judgment in the method of correlation's third moment are but stylized ways
of describing the use to which a theological judgment of congruence is put.
But if so, then there may be advantage to realizing what actually transpires
beneath the style, as well as in knowing that the conditions of the possibility
of theological congruence in no way make congruence actually happen. 34
C.S.C., Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale University, 1973)
esp. 215-51. A family resemblance to this proposal can be found in Donald Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1984) 245-64.
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